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Abstract: Do the social, economic and political environment in a country affect 
agricultural efficiency? We address this question by estimating a stochastic frontier 
model of agricultural productivity in 138 countries from 1984 to 2013. By observing 
how the business condition, level of social harmony and quality of government in a 
country affect agricultural inefficiency, we find there to be a positive effect. However, 
land quality as quantified by percentage of land irrigated, and openness to global 
trade have a more positive effect on decreasing agricultural productivity. We also find 
that consistent with literature, former British colonies exhibit higher technical 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Agriculture accounts for approximately 2.8% of overall world income (World Bank, 2012) 
which, considering other sectors, is not monumental. However, in the context of development 
economics, it is important to not overlook the impact the agricultural sector could have in 
changing many lives, poverty alleviation and improving overall economic well-being. 
Globally, employment in agriculture has declined drastically but steadily over the past 
decades. In 1991, 42% of the world’s total population were involved in agriculture but as of 
2017, that number has decreased to approximately 29% (World Bank, 2018). The decline in 
agricultural participation, however, is mainly driven by developed nations as they transition 
from agricultural economies to industrialized economies. However, certain regions have seen 
growth in agricultural employment. Between 1999 to 2009, growth in agricultural 
employment accounted for 50% of total employment growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
agricultural employment growth accounted for 33% of total employment growth in South 
Asia (FAO, 2012). This shows that many developing countries are largely agrarian. 70% of 
total participation in agriculture, approximately 1.3 billion people, are from low-income 
countries where agriculture is their primary source of livelihood.  
Therefore, given that many of today’s developing countries are largely agrarian with a 
majority of the population depending on agriculture for food and employment, growth in 
productivity has become a major focus. In addition, productivity growth is essential to meet 
the demand of the steady rapidly increasing population in terms of food and raw materials 
(Coelli & Rao, 2005). Past literature has shown that growth in agricultural productivity plays 
a major role in meeting the ever-increasing global demand for food and in improving food 
security (Griliches, 1957; Piesse and Thirtle, 2010; Alston and Pardey, 2014; Fugile and 
Toole, 2014 etc.).  
Thus, many interventions targeting the increase in productivity have taken place. Most 
importantly was the inclusion of technological advancements, especially during the green 
revolution in the 1960s, which saw a large increase in productivity. This success was 
attributed to high rates of investment in proper irrigation, fertilizer, seed development, crop 
research, infrastructure and market development as well as crop genetic improvements. 
Between 1960 to 2000, developing countries saw an increase in wheat yield of 208%, rice was 
109%, maize 157% and continued high yields in other crops with China and other Asian 
countries experiencing stronger yield growth (Pingali, 2012). 
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There is strong evidence that agricultural research and development has a large impact 
on productivity growth and that it has the most consistent influence on observed multifactor 
productivity growth (Griliches 1973; Kendrick and Grossman 1980; Sveikauskaus and 
Sveikauskaus 1982). However, these global aggregates, as shown in Figure 1, mask the 
underlying geographic disparities between countries. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to 
explore the main causes of the discrepancies we see in productivity, especially in middle to 
low income countries. Most of these countries are largely agrarian with a large portion of 
their population dependent on agriculture. Yet we consistently observe low food production 
growth per capita in Sub-Saharan African countries compared to other economies. 
Several studies have analyzed the cross-country differences in agricultural productivity 
(Hayami and Ruttan, 1970 and 1971; Kawagoe et al. 1985; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1993, 1997, 
1998, 1999; Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997; Coelli and Rao, 1998 etc.). Each study uses different 
econometrical methods and yet the results seem to be consistent in showing global increases 
in total factor productivity and aggregate increases in efficiency. Moreover, they also show 
significantly large changes in total factor productivity (TFP) in Asia, mainly due to China, 
compared to very small changes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Coelli and Rao (2005), perform a 
cross-country examination of TFP growth and show that Asia performed best with annual 
TFP growth of 2.9% while growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 0.6%. This is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Past literature has chalked this discrepancy to the late introduction of private research 
programs in Africa, or the lag in breeding efforts of plants that were of relative importance 
to African farmers (Pingali 2012). While some others have blamed it on low labor 
productivity in the region (Lusigi and Thirtle 1997; Piesse and Thirtle 2010).  
In addition, the primary focus of past research has been in increasing productivity. This 
approach assumes that farmers are already producing at their maximum capacity. It also 
assumes that there is uniformity in technology and agricultural inputs such as land, labor, 
livestock and machinery. However, given the discrepancies we see in productivity, we cannot 
make these bold claims.  
This paper instead, looks at the factors that keep farmers from reaching their maximum 
capacity, given their level of input and technology. What makes them less efficient. Efficiency 
studies on agricultural productivity have been carried out by authors such as Belbase and 
Grabowski (1985) and Abdulai et. al (2013).  
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However, Fulginiti et al. (2004) look at how institutions affect agricultural efficiency in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. They conclude that former UK colonies exhibit higher productivity 
gains, while former Portuguese colonies show net reductions in productivity (Fulginiti et al. 
2004). This view that historical institutions (colonial heritage etc.) in a country could explain 
the discrepancies we observe in agricultural productivity is the main motivation behind this 
paper. However, instead of looking at historical institutions, we look at present day 
institutions in the form of country risk indicators.  
To provide a wider understanding of the literature of institutions and agricultural 
productivity, we will first discuss the literature on agriculture and economic productivity and 
afterwards look at how that knowledge has been applied to agricultural productivity.  
1.1 Institutions and Economic Outcomes 
North (1990) defines institutions as “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. In their paper, The Role of 
Institutions in Growth and Development (2008), Acemoglu and Robinson borrow from 
North’s (1997) definition of institutions clarifying that the major effect of institutions is 
through incentives. Therefore, they state that since these institutions are key determinants 
of incentives, then they should have major effects on economic outcomes including growth 
and development, inequality and poverty (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).  
This notion has been proven by many cross-country studies that have looked at various 
institutional indicators and their effect on economic outcomes. For example, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) look at the effect of social capital, measured in trust and civic cooperation, on 
economic performance (GDP and investment). They find that trust and cooperation is 
stronger in countries with low inequality, high literacy rate and institutions that restrain 
government and chief executive officers. Their results show that institutional factors such as 
a well-developed financial sector, secure property rights, reliable contracts etc. are important 
for a productive economy. 
Similarly, Mauro (1995) looks at the impact of corruption on economic growth and finds 
that corruption negatively impacts investment and therefore, economic growth. Djankov et 
al. (2002) look at the regulation of entry for new firms across different countries and find that 
countries with stricter entry barriers have lower institutional quality. They find that the 
stricter regulations are usually associated with higher corruption, large inequality rates and 
more unofficial economies. They also found that less democratic countries, countries with less 
restraints on political ruling, with interventionist governments, tend to have strict barriers 
to entry. Other studies have looked at the impact of education on economic outcomes as well 
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and have found a positive correlation (Barro and Lee, 2001; Aghion et al., 2009; Hanushek 
and Woessmann, 2010). 
Thus, correlation observed between specific institutional factors and economic outcomes, 
have led many economists to believe that the political, economic and socio-economic build of 
a nation could have a significant impact on growth and development. 
1.2 Institutions and Agricultural Outcomes 
 Although many studies have looked at the effect of institutions on economic outcomes, 
there has been little empirical analysis done on the specific institutional qualities that affect 
agricultural outcomes. As stated earlier, agriculture is important to development as many of 
the world’s poorest are employed in the sector and rely on it, not only for income, but also 
for food. Thus, this study, much like other correlational studies, seeks to look at the specific 
institutional qualities that affect agricultural outcomes. The results could help inform policy 
by identifying the specific institutional factors lead to the discrepancies we observe in 
agricultural productivity. 
 There have been several conceptual and theoretical analysis on the impact of 
institutions on agricultural development (Slangen, 2001; Leach et al. 1999; Pretty and 
Chamber,1993). Zylberstajn (2009), in his paper, found that with the increase in technological 
advancement in Brazil, having a strong government system that fosters deeper interaction 
between local governments, multinational corporation and stakeholder groups is essential to 
further development. Cloete (2013), in his study of institutions and agricultural development 
in South Africa, also found that having a strong governance structure is essential to 
agricultural development. He emphasizes the need for public-private partnerships, water user 
associations, proper rural finance systems, equity sharing and better human capital through 
education.  
In his conceptual study on the impact of institutions on agriculture in ancient France, 
Hoffman (1988) looks at how the political society in the old regime worked to the detriment 
of agriculture. He compares the productivity of land and labor in France with England’s 
productivity and finds that the political system, including the weak French legislation at that 
time, to be the main cause for the failure in agriculture.  
These studies point to the role of institutions on agricultural productivity, however they 
are theoretical in nature. Fulginiti et al. (2004), take on a more empirical view of the subject 
however, drawing from Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001, 2005 and 2013) view on 
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that the political, economic and 
socioeconomic institutions we see today are themselves products of historical institutions 
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such as colonial rule and former political structures. The authors argue that these could 
explain the current institutions at play today which could explain the different economic 
outcomes we observe. Following this theory, Fulginiti et al. (2004) look at how colonial 
history, conflicts and democratic quality affect agricultural outcomes for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Fulginiti et al. (2004) through empirical analysis, find that former UK 
colonies exhibited higher productivity gains compared to other countries, while former 
Portuguese and Belgium colonies showed reduction in productivity. They also find that there 
is a significant reduction in productivity during conflicts and wars and countries with better 
political rights and democratic quality exhibited higher productivity.  
For this study, we will be following Fulginiti et al.’s (2004) empirical analysis, however 
we will be looking at what present day economic, political and socioeconomic factors affect 
agricultural productivity performance. To accomplish this, we divide the ICRG variables into 
three groups; Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality. We look at 
these indicators separately and together, controlling for exogenous factors such as land 
quality, labor quality, openness to trade and environmental conditions, all consistent with 
Fulginiti et. al (2004). The results show that on their own, these institutional indicators are 
negative and significant which indicates that they decrease inefficiency. However, when we 
combine them together, they lose their significance and we find a stronger effect in the land 
quality variable, Irrigation. This strong significance in irrigation, supports the findings by 
Block (1994), Frisvold and Ingram (1995), Thirtle et al. (1995), Chang-Kang et al. (1999) and 
Fulginiti et al. (2004). 
Following this introduction, Section 2 of our paper presents a description of our analytical 
approach; the stochastic production frontier model. Section 3 presents our data and empirical 
specification. Section 4 examines our main empirical results, and we summarize and present 
conclusions in section 5. 
2. Analytical Approach: The Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
Productivity is measured by output per unit of input. Following Fulginiti et al. (2004), 
we adopt the production function approach as pioneered by Solow and Griliches. Griliches 
(1998) used the Cobb Douglas production function to estimate total factor productivity, while 
introducing a variable, that represented the effect of research and development. Aigner et al. 
(1997) and Meeusen et al. (1977) modified the production form however, to reflect technical 
inefficiencies, thus the standard neoclassical production function became a stochastic 
production frontier.  
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In this study, we analyze countries’ technical inefficiency to identify the institutional 
factors that explain the discrepancies we observe in productivity between countries. The 
stochastic production frontier model estimates the maximum output level for a country based 
on a given set of production inputs. Thus, the difference between the country’s maximum 
output and its actual output is defined as the technical inefficiency. Following Battese and 
Coelli (1995) the general specification of the frontier model is: 
   𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡)       (1) 
where subscripts i and t are country and year indices respectively. Y represents the real 
output of the country, X is an N x 1 vector of production inputs and  is a vector of coefficients.  
is the error term in equation (1) consisting of the random error, which is assumed to be 
normally distributed i.i.d. N(0,).  
The technical inefficiency estimated by , is a non-negative random variable, with a 
truncated normal distribution with mean  i.i.d. N(µ, ).  The mean as defined by Wang and 
Wong (2012) is represented as a linear function of certain determinants: 
                                                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛿 =  𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑚𝑧𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1                                  (2) 
where  is a 1 x p vector of variables that could affect the efficiency of a country, and  is a p x 
1 vector of unknown parameters, the coefficients to be estimated. This variable measures 
technical inefficiency across production units, the inefficiency effects are assumed to be 
independently distributed for different countries and years (Wang and Wong, 2012). This 
variable accounts for heterogeneity across countries that can cause deviations from the 
maximum potential output. 
 Thus, technical efficiency (TE), defined as the ratio of actual output to the maximum 
output is calculated as in equation (3) and takes on values of 0 and 1, 1 indicating full technical 
efficiency. 
                                                                           𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡) |𝜀𝑖𝑡]                (3) 
For interpretation sake, as the model estimates how far a country’s actual output is 
compared to its maximum output. The smaller the coefficient   in equation (2), the more 
efficient the country is. This tells us that the distance between the maximum output level and 
actual output level is small. This illustrated in Figure 3. 
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3. Data and Empirical Specification  
3.1 Data 
The research question we are addressing in this paper is what economic, political and 
socioeconomic factors affect agricultural productivity. To answer this question, we will be 
looking at 138 countries with varying institutional qualities, ranging from high income to 
low income countries, over the last three decades (1984-2013). To estimate the maximum 
production function, we use panel data on output from USDA-ERS (2013) and conventional 
agricultural inputs; land, labor, fertilizer, machinery (tractors) and livestock from FAOSTAT 
(2018). The descriptive statistics for the dataset are available in Table 1. 
Agricultural output is the quantity of agricultural production in millions of constant 
2004-2006 U.S dollars. Agricultural land is measured as the sum of arable land and 
permanent crops, as defined by FAOSTAT (2018) in thousand hectares. Agricultural labor is 
measured as the number of people who are economically involved agriculture. Fertilizer is 
the quantity of fertilizer plant nutrient in use (N, P2O5, and K2O) measured in metric tons. 
Farm machinery is he number of agricultural tractors in use. The livestock variable is the 
number of animals on farms, measured in thousands.  
Following Fulginiti et. al (2004), we use two different types of efficiency changing 
variables in our analysis, those that allow for qualitative input differences, which are used as 
controls and those that capture institutional differences across countries. We use four input 
quality measures: (1) labor quality, proxied by school attainment taken from Barro-Lee(2015), 
(2) land quality, proxied by percentage of land irrigated taken from FAOSTAT (2018), (3) 
Drought, which controls for environmental changes, measured by the number of occurrences 
in a country for a given year taken from CRED EM-DAT (2009). Lastly, we include an 
openness variable, not included in past literature, this is meant to capture any effects of trade 
policy within a country, data was calculated by the GDP share of imports and exports taken 
from World Bank (2018). The openness variable is also used to represent any variation we 
may observe from a country’s openness, such as foreign investments and to a lesser degree 
research and development.  
We also include a variable for the numbers of years since each country has been 
independent. This allows for exogenous variation in the model and strengthens our 
institutional analysis. Although Fulgniti et al. (2004) find no significance, we find there to be 
an effect when paired with social harmony. This suggests that the longer the country has 
been independent, the more efficient it is in agricultural productivity. This data was retrieved 
from Hensel (2014). 
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The institutional variables are taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 
2018). The ICRG rating provides 22 variables for political, financial and economic sub-
categories. However, we use the Political Risk Rating sub-category as it contains measures 
across each category, covering both political and social risk ratings. The Political Risk Rating 
comprises of twelve variables where the minimum number of points for each component is 
zero and the maximum number of points depends on the fixed weight each component is 
given in the overall political risk assessment. (PRS Group, 2012). The data is interpreted as 
the lower the risk rating, the higher the risk and the higher the risk rating, the lower the risk. 
Thus, the twelve variables are Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment 
Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religious 
Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucracy 
Quality. Table 2 shows each risk component, their maximum points and summary statistics 
of the risk component in our data.  
For simplification in our analysis, we group the twelve variables into three main 
institutional indicators; Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality. 
Table 3 shows the grouping system. Although, we do not find any formal analysis done with 
this type of grouping, in their cross-country analysis, Hellman et. al (2000) point to the effect 
bureaucracy quality and corruption have on the business environment. We include 
investment profile as this is strongly linked to business environments and socioeconomic 
conditions as well. We link the conflict variable to social harmony, the assumption is that 
internal (ethnic or religious) and external conflicts affect the ability for people to coexist and 
thrive hamoniously. Rothstein and Teorell (2008) in their study of government quality state 
democracy, rule of law and efficiency in government as three concepts of quality of 
governance which we follow in our paper. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of these 
three institutional variables. These institutional ratings across countries is displayed in 
Figure(s) 4, 5 and 6. 
3.2 Empirical Specification 
We model the production function (1) with a flexible trans log functional form. This 
functional form, as opposed to the Cobb-Douglas functional form does not impose constant 
elasticity of substitution. (Wang and Wong, 2012). The log-linear trans log production 
function is thus: 
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             𝑙𝑛[𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡]𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                                    +∑ 𝛽2𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥
2
𝑖𝑗𝑡
  
                                    + ∑ ∑ 𝛽3
5
𝑘>𝑗 𝑗𝑘
5
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 
                                    + ∑ 𝛽4𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑇 
       +𝛽5T + 𝛽5𝑇
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡       (4)
  
Where 𝑖 is from 1 to 138 representing the countries, and j is from 1 to 5 representing the 
agricultural inputs (Land, labor, fertilizer, machinery and livestock) and the inputs  represent 
the inputs at each time period t from 1 to 30.  
  is the agricultural output, x’s are inputs and T is the time from 1 to 30, which is used 
as a proxy for technical change.  is the one-sided technical inefficiency measure, assumed to 
be truncated at zero and normally distributed i.i.d. N(µ, ), capturing the heterogeneity across 
countries which will help explain the differences we observe across countries. We also allow 
for idiosyncratic error by including the random error , i.i.d. N(0,) which is independent of . 
 The technical inefficiency term is specified using the efficiency changing variables 
and is estimated simultaneously with equation (4) as: 
 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑚
5
𝑚=1 𝑧𝑚,𝑖𝑗𝑡 
        =𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  
                +𝛿2𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡                 
                + 𝛿3𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  
                + 𝛿4𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡    
                + 𝛿5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡              (5) 
Where each variable is given for each country i, at time t, tested for each input j.  
 The simultaneous maximum-likelihood procedure was made up of four sets of 
specifications. Each of the institutional variables (Business Conditions, Social Harmony and 
Government Quality) were tested on their own, using the qualitative input variables as 
controls. The fourth test was of all the institutional variables combined in the model.   
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4. Results 
Empirical results are provided for each of the institutional variables, each containing four 
regressions as the qualitative inputs are added to the model. As this is an efficiency study we 
only include the technical inefficiency results. 
Result 1 shows the results for Business Conditions on its own. The coefficient is small 
and negative across all specifications which indicates that the increase in business conditions 
leads to less inefficiency in agricultural productivity. In columns (2) to (4) we observe 
significance in the irrigation and openness values as well. These values show stronger 
significance as compared to the Business Conditions variable.  
Result 2 shows the results for Social Harmony on its own. The coefficients here are also 
small and negative. However, we only find significance in the first three columns (1) to (3) 
without the Independence variable. Column (4) shows that when we include the variable for 
years since independence, the effect of social harmony is not statistically significant. However, 
irrigation, openness and school attainment are negative and significant.  
Result 3 shows the results for Government Quality on its own. Here we observe 
significance across all specifications (1) to (4). In columns (1) to (3), the coefficients are small 
and negative which indicates that the quality of governance reduces agricultural inefficiency. 
However, when we include years since independence, we observe that the coefficient on 
government quality is positive but significant. Which indicates that better government 
quality contributes to agricultural inefficiency. We believe that this is because of the fall in 
productivity in most developed countries which coincide with better governance. Here as 
well, irrigation, school attainment and openness are small and significant.  
Result 4 shows the results for all institutional variables combined and all efficiency 
changing qualitative inputs included. Here we observe negative and small coefficients for 
both Business Conditions and Social Harmony. Still we see that better governance correlates 
with less efficiency.  However, we observe significance in the irrigation variable for columns 
(1), (3) and (4). 
The significance we find in irrigation is consistent with the findings by Block (1994), 
Frisvold and Ingram (1995), Thirtle et al. (1995), Chan-Kang et. al (1999) and Fulginiti et al. 
(2004). However, our results show drought to not be significant which is also consistent with 
the above literatures but the coefficients on the value are small and negative, indicating that 
drought decreases inefficiency. An explanation for this could be found in Rockstrom et al.’s 
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(2002) study looking at rainwater management in drought prone environments. The authors 
find that there are no agro-hydrological limitations to productivity even in drought prone 
environments as farmers adopt more risk aversion strategies. The significance we observe in 
the openness variable tells us that according to our study, open trade policies contribute to 
decreasing agricultural inefficiency, as the flow of information and technology across borders, 
bringing in innovations from research and development, this leads to more efficiency. We use 
the openness variable as a proxy for research and development. 
Result 5 shows the results of all institutional variables at different crop levels. These 
categories were classified according to FAOSTAT (2018). Here we find that for almost all 
crops our three institutional variables are not very significant. However, Figure 8 shows that 
beverages and spices have the highest yield across all regions, and we see significance in the 
land quality variable, percentage of land irrigated. 
Figure 6 shows technical efficiency across all regions using the TE function in equation 
(3) estimated with the composite political risk variable (all 12 institutional indicators). We 
find that North America has had the most consistent and high level of efficiency, close to 1. 
We also find that technical efficiency in Sub-Saharan Africa has been quite high, close to 1. 
Across all regions, we see a sharp decrease in technical efficiency coinciding with the years 
2008-2010. In their study of decisions made by agricultural and non-agricultural banks pre-
recession, Li et al. (2018) confirm the impact the recession had on efficiency in the agricultural 
sector which is shown in the graph.  In addition, we test out Fulginiti et al.(2004)’s result 
that show higher technical efficiency for former British colonies. We find this to be true as 
evidenced in Figure 8. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to see if the differences in agricultural productivity across 
countries could be explained by institutional indicators. To accomplish this, we use a 
stochastic production frontier model to estimate a maximum output level and using efficiency 
changing variables, including the institutional variables, we run tests to see if these variables 
decrease or increase inefficiency.  
We use a panel dataset with 138 countries over 30 years with output as the measure of 
productivity and include five conventional input variables (land, labor, fertilizer, machinery 
and livestock) to estimate the production function. For our inefficiency function, we use the 
institutional variables and four qualitative input variables; irrigation, as a proxy for land 
quality, school attainment as a proxy for labor quality, drought for environmental conditions 
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and openness for trade policy. The institutional variables we use are made up of ICRG’s 
Political risk ratings and are Business Conditions, Social Harmony and Government Quality. 
Our results show that on their own, each of the three institutional indicators are small, 
negative and significant which indicates that they could decrease inefficiency, meaning that 
they increase efficiency. However, when we include years since independence, we find that no 
significance in Government Quality. This result coincides with the decrease in agricultural 
productivity we find in high income countries with better government quality. We also see 
significance in the openness and irrigation variables when we aggregate crop yields. This 
leads us to conclude that the flow of information, ability to trade and access to global markets 
contributes to decreasing inefficiency. In addition, land quality matters. We find there to be 
strong evidence for better land quality having a positive impact on efficiency.  
While the consistency we observe in the significance of the irrigation variable is 
consistent with previous literature, it also indicates that there are other factors that impact 
the efficiency of agricultural productivity beyond institutional reasons which could explain 
the cross-country differences we observe. Omitted variable bias is a major concern in this 
model as we cannot possibly include every single variable that affects efficiency, a missing 
measure we are most concerned with is research and development. 
There is strong evidence that agricultural research and development has a large impact 
on productivity growth and that it has the most consistent influence on observed multifactor 
productivity growth (Griliches 1973; Kendrick and Grossman 1980; Sveikauskaus and 
Sveikauskaus 1982). Additionally, economic studies have shown that research and 
development contribute to approximately 0.3 percent annually to productivity growth 
(Griliches, 1980). 
However, due to data limitations we could not include a measure for agricultural research 
and development. However, we include openness and school attainment to capture the 
impacts of research and development. The assumption we make here is that the more open a 
country is to trade, the more we would observe increases in technological adoption which 
should reflect in the output. Likewise, a more educated labor force could lead to a more 
advanced approach to agriculture which should also reflect in the output. However, both 
variables were not significant. The coefficient on school attainment is small and negative but 
openness is positive. 
Our study showed that while institutions are important in the efficiency of agricultural 
output, they may not necessary explain the differences in productivity we observe across 
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countries. To explore this more, we recommend that further study be done including a 
measure of agricultural research and development.  
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Appendix 
FIGURE 1: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 
Note: Agricultural productivity growth across income levels 
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 
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FIGURE 3: EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN STOCHASTIC PRODUCTION 
FRONTIER MODEL 
  
Note: F represents the production function at the maximum  
output level, xi represents country I whose actual output is yi, 
thus, the technical inefficiency measures the distance between  
yj (the maximum output level) and yi (the actual output level).     
 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OUTPUT AND INPUT VARIABLES 
 
Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES   N Mean S.D. Min Max 
y 
      
Output (Millions $)   873 342 838 0.22 5250 
x (inputs) 
      
Labour (Millions 
Persons) 
 
873 45.08 142.00 0.01 660.00 
Fertilizer (Millions 
Tonnes) 
 
873 12.62 53.47 0.00 426.00 
Land (1000 Ha) 
 
873 22.32 41.43 0.00 187.78 
Animals (Millions 
Head) 
 
873 736.00 1760.00 0.69 8940.00 
Machinery (1000 in 
Use) 
  873 387.95 763.06 0.01 4592.55 
µ (efficiency 
variables) 
      
Irrigation (1000 Ha) 
 
859 5.55 13.61 0.00 64.50 
Drought 
(Occurrence) 
 
873 0.14 0.42 0.00 3.00 
Openness 
 
867 67.27 33.54 0.02 218.85 
School Attainment 
 
629 8.24 2.32 1.21 13.10 
Independence  873 150 194 20 1070 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF POLITICAL RISK ASSESMENT 
COMPONENT MEAN S.D. MIN MAX 
(DATA)* 
MAX 
(POSSIBLE POINTS) ** 
GOVERNMENT STABILITY 7.4 2.2 1 12 12 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS 
4.8 1.7 0.5 10 12 
INVESTMENT PROFILE 6.7 2.2 0 12 12 
INTERNAL CONFLICT 8.0 2.4 0 12 12 
EXTERNAL CONFLICT 9.4 2.1 0 12 12 
CORRUPTION 2.5 0.9 0 6 6 
MILITARY IN POLITICS 2.9 1.6 0 6 6 
RELIGIOUS TENSIONS 4.3 1.4 0 6 6 
LAW AND ORDER 3.0 1.1 0 6 6 
ETHNIC TENSIONS 3.7 1.4 0 6 6 
DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
3.3 1.3 0 6 6 
BUREAUCRACY QUALITY 1.7 0.9 0 4 4 
TOTAL  57.7 11.8 8.5 83.1 100 
Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation 
           *This is the maximum points for our data 
           ** This is the maximum points in the composite index by ICRG 
 
TABLE 3: COMPONENTS OF MAIN INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
Business 
Condition 
Social 
Harmony 
Government 
Quality 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
Internal  
Conflict 
Government 
Stability 
Investment 
Profile 
External 
Conflict 
Law and Order 
Corruption Religion  
Tension 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Bureaucracy  
Quality 
Ethnic  
Tensions 
Military in 
Politics 
 
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MAIN INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
Variables N Mean S. D. Min Max 
Business 
Condition 
3,872 0.53 0.18 0.02 0.96 
Social Harmony 3,872 0.72 0.17 0.04 1.00 
Government 
Quality 
3,872 0.62 0.17 0.04 0.97 
Note: S.D refers to the Standard Deviation 
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FIGURE 4: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SOCIAL HARMONY 
 
 
FIGURE 5: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF GOVERNMENT QUALITY 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY ACROSS REGIONS 
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FIGURE 7: CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
IN AGRICULTURE 
 
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY FOR COLONIAL RULE 
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RESULTS FOR AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
 
RESULT 1: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR BUSINESS 
CONDITIONS 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Business Conditions -0.112*** -0.106** -0.0957*** -0.0548* 
 (0.0370) (0.0419) (0.0358) (0.0324) 
Irrigation -0.0371** -0.0402*** -0.0411*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.00966) 
School Attainment -0.0380 0.00437 -0.00385 -0.0153 
 (0.0611) (0.0355) (0.0345) (0.0306) 
Openness  -0.00112** -0.00126** -0.00126** 
  (0.000449) (0.000492) (0.000523) 
Drought   -0.0363 -0.0307 
   (0.0241) (0.0213) 
Independence    -0.000180 
    (0.000148) 
Log Likelihood 1237.7 1245.0 1253.4 1288.0 
Wald Chi-square 1652734.9 1998027.5 2661239.6 7493691.7 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 625 624 624 624 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
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RESULT 2: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR SOCIAL HARMONY 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social Harmony -0.152*** -0.150** -0.157*** -0.0521 
 (0.0417) (0.0655) (0.0460) (0.0434) 
Irrigation -0.0450*** -0.0369 -0.0377*** -0.0540*** 
 (0.00770) (0.0303) (0.0129) (0.00901) 
School Attainment -0.0437 0.0116 0.00861 -0.0781** 
 (0.0286) (0.0336) (0.0349) (0.0344) 
Openness  -0.00102 -0.00105** -0.00146*** 
  (0.000719) (0.000453) (0.000498) 
Drought   -0.0355 -0.0226 
   (0.0244) (0.0220) 
Independence    -0.000403** 
    (0.000173) 
Log Likelihood 1322.1 1247.9 1249.4 1287.7 
Wald Chi-square 123008502.9 2580132.6 2372916.3 3203419.4 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 625 624 624 624 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
 
 
RESULT 3: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR GOVERNMENT 
QUALITY 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government Quality -0.0508 -0.0793** -0.0862** 0.111** 
 (0.0777) (0.0368) (0.0409) (0.0542) 
Irrigation -0.0299 -0.0289*** -0.0299* -0.0518*** 
 (0.0327) (0.00947) (0.0177) (0.0104) 
School Attainment -0.0511 -0.00337 -0.00832 -0.133*** 
 (0.128) (0.0343) (0.0339) (0.0311) 
Openness  -0.000891** -0.000940 -0.00117*** 
  (0.000403) (0.000603) (0.000436) 
Drought   -0.0318 -0.0147 
   (0.0260) (0.0355) 
Independence    -0.000835 
    (0.00147) 
Log Likelihood 1255.8 1247.1 1246.2 1291.2 
Wald Chi-square 7020042.2 1596220.8 2995715.7 1568481.8 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 625 624 624 624 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
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RESULT 4: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES FOR ALL 
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Business Conditions -0.0792 -0.0555 -0.0665 -0.112** 
 (0.0623) (0.125) (0.0594) (0.0555) 
Social Harmony -0.126** -0.120 -0.114* -0.0848 
 (0.0630) (0.0731) (0.0652) (0.0751) 
Government Quality 0.0359 0.0422 0.0233 0.0792 
 (0.0873) (0.194) (0.0980) (0.0792) 
Irrigation -0.0378*** -0.0394 -0.0384* -0.0335*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0450) (0.0203) (0.0122) 
School Attainment -0.0205 0.0192 0.0140 0.00410 
 (0.0434) (0.0305) (0.0355) (0.0419) 
Openness  -0.00106 -0.00104** -0.000614 
  (0.000737) (0.000482) (0.000469) 
Drought   -0.0346 -0.00838 
   (0.0234) (0.0332) 
Independence    -0.000787 
    (0.000590) 
Log Likelihood 1240.9 1260.5 1251.3 1260.9 
Wald Chi-square 1654459.4 2456512.4 2403785.8 1658555.0 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 625 624 624 624 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
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RESULT 5: TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY ESTIMATES: CROP LEVEL 
 
